Synchronicity as Synalogy (Synthetic Analogy)

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“Synalogy” As Described in Noesis 82 (1993) Compared to “The Theory of Theories” Essay (2001)

“"Synchronicity" is an etymologically restricted term which implies that two apparently related but causally unconnected events have occurred at the same time. The "same time" constraint is non-general and thus of limited use. In the CTMU, this concept is generalized as synalogy (etymology: SYNthetic • ANALOGY), which means the same thing minus the time restriction. I.e., a synalogy is an acausal "meaningful coincidence". Since quantum nonlocality is an example of synalogy, and since the CTMU offers a syntax for nonlocality, the CTMU obviously offers a syntax for synalogy; and since synchronicity is just a restricted form of synalogy, the CTMU syntax applies to it as well.

Inductive regression in search of causal and compositional relationships terminates at unbound telesis, the observer-relativized collapse of which creates information. Telesis is distributive over specetime and may thus undergo nonlocal collapse due to cognitive parallelism among distant observers, thereby reflecting the absolute inseparability of cognition and information.

Given the close relationship between causality and decidability, explanations of synchronicity are limited by the undecidability of acausal relationships.”

“The messages of Duhem-Quine and Lowenheim-Skolem are as follows: universes do not uniquely determine theories according to empirical laws of scientific observation, and theories do not uniquely determine universes according to rational laws of mathematics. The model-theoretic correspondence between theories and their universes is subject to ambiguity in both directions. If we add this descriptive kind of ambiguity to ambiguities of measurement, e.g. the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle that governs the subatomic scale of reality, and the internal theoretical ambiguity captured by undecidability, we see that ambiguity is an inescapable ingredient of our knowledge of the world. It seems that math and science are…well, inexact sciences.

How, then, can we ever form a true picture of reality? There may be a way. For example, we could begin with the premise that such a picture exists, if only as a “limit” of theorization (ignoring for now the matter of showing that such a limit exists). Then we could educe categorical relationships involving the logical properties of this limit to arrive at a description of reality in terms of reality itself. In other words, we could build a self-referential theory of reality whose variables represent reality itself, and whose relationships are logical tautologies. Then we could add an instructive twist. Since logic consists of the rules of thought, i.e. of mind, what we would really be doing is interpreting reality in a generic theory of mind based on logic. By definition, the result would be a cognitive-theoretic model of the universe.”

Comparison to “Synthetic A Priori” in Kantian Metaphysics

“Kant’s main innovation to the a priori/posteriori and analytic/synthetic schemas is to note that the analytic a priori and the synthetic a posteriori do not necessarily exhaust the realm of possible judgments. Here he essentially can be understood to deny that “Hume’s Fork” is an adequate representation of the structure of human knowledge. According to Kant, there are also synthetic a priori judgments that are possible. Kant argues that causal judgments are a clear example:

“it is easy to show that in human cognition there actually are such necessary and in the strictest sense universal, thus pure a priori judgments. If one wants an example from the sciences, one need only look at all the propositions of mathematics; if one would have one from the commonest use of the understanding, the proposition that every alteration must have a cause will do; indeed in the latter the very concept of a cause so obviously contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and a strict universality of rule that it would be entirely lost if one sought, as Hume did, to derive it from a frequent association of that which happens with that which precedes and a habit (thus a merely subjective necessity) of connecting representations arising from that association (CPR B4-5) Take the proposition: “Everything that happens has its cause.” In the concept of something that happens, I think, to be sure, of an existence that was preceded by a time, etc., and from that analytic judgments can be drawn. But the concept of a cause lies entirely outside that concept, and indicates something different than the concept of what happens in general, and is therefore not contained in the latter representation at all. How then do I come to say something quite different about that which happens in general, and to cognize the concept of cause as belonging to it, indeed necessarily, even though not contained in it? What is the unknown=X here on which the understanding depends when it believes itself to discover beyond the concept of A a predicate that is foreign to it yet which it nevertheless believes to be connected with it? (CPR B13-14)

Kant argues here that our judgments concerning events presuppose that they do not just occur but are caused to occur, that we know this to be true necessarily and universally, and that we have no explanation of this fact unless the judgments we make in such cases are synthetic a priori judgments. The question remains, however, just how such synthetic a priori judgments could be possibly true, much less known to be so. What is it that could link the concepts in a subject-predicate judgment such that the truth of the judgment holds necessarily and universally, while its nevertheless being true that the predicate is not contained in the subject of the judgment, and thus that the judgment is not analytic?

Now the entire final aim of our speculative a priori cognition rests on such synthetic, i.e., ampliative principles; for the analytic ones are, to be sure, most important and necessary, but only for attaining that distinctness of concepts which is requisite for a secure and extended synthesis as a really new acquisition (CPR B13-14)”

Kant argues that we need to explain how synthetic a priori judgments are possible, and that the explanation of the possibility of significant portions of our knowledge rests on this, including mathematics and natural science, as well as the very possibility of metaphysics.”

“Given Kant’s theory of truth, modal dualism also implies the worldly existence of two irreducibly different types of modal facts as truth-makers for analytically and synthetically necessary truths respectively. In short if Kant is right, then there are fundamentally more things in heaven and earth than modal monists are prepared to acknowledge. Moreover Kant holds that all the basic statements of traditional metaphysics are, at least in intention, synthetic a priori judgments (B18). Hence his famous critique of traditional metaphysics in the Transcendental Dialectic is nothing but a deepened and extended investigation of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments.

But what is a synthetic a priori judgment? Combining the a priori-a posteriori distinction with the analytic-synthetic distinction, Kant derives four possible kinds of judgment: (1) analytic a priori, (2) analytic a posteriori, (3) synthetic a priori, and (4) synthetic a posteriori. By virtue of the fact that analytic judgments are necessarily true, and given Kant’s thesis that necessity entails apriority, it follows that all analytic judgments are a priori and that there is no such thing as an analytic a posteriori judgment. By contrast, synthetic judgments can be either a priori or a posteriori. Synthetic a posteriori judgments are empirical, contingent judgments, although they may vary widely as to their degree of generality. Synthetic a priori judgments, by contrast, are non-empirical, non-contingent judgments.

More precisely however, synthetic a priori judgments have three essential features. First, because a synthetic a priori judgment is a priori, its meaning and truth are strictly underdetermined by sensory impressions and/or contingent natural objects or facts, and it is also necessarily true. Second, because a synthetic a priori judgment is synthetic, not analytic, its truth is not determined by conceptual/truth-functional-logical/monadic-predicate-logical factors alone, and its denial is logically consistent. Third, as is the case with all synthetic judgments, the meaning and truth of a synthetic a priori judgment is intuition-based. This third factor is the crucial one. For while the meaning and truth of synthetic a posteriori judgments is based on empirical intuitions, the meaning and truth of synthetic a priori judgments is based on pure intuitions or our a priori formal representations of space and time (B73) (8: 245) (11: 38). Now since according to Kant our a priori formal representations of space and time are both necessary conditions of the possibility of human experience and also necessary conditions of the objective validity or empirical meaningfulness of judgments, which in turn confers truth-valuedness upon propositions, it then follows that a synthetic a priori judgment is a proposition that is true in all and only the humanly experienceable possible worlds and truth-valueless otherwise (Hanna 2001, 239–245). By sharp contrast, analytic judgments, as logical truths in either a narrow (truth-functional or syllogistic) or broad (intensional logic) sense, are true in all logically possible worlds, including those logically possible worlds in which human experience is not possible, i.e., the worlds containing non-phenomenal or non-apparent entities, especially including things-in-themselves, i.e., the “noumenal worlds.”

So analytic and synthetic a priori judgments sharply differ not only in the nature of their semantic content (i.e., concept-based/truth-functional-logic-based/monadic-predicate-logic-based vs. intuition-based) but also in their modal scope (true in all logically possible worlds vs. true in all and only humanly experienceable worlds and truth-valueless otherwise). Nevertheless, despite this sharp difference in modal scope—from which it follows, perhaps surprisingly, that for Kant there are logically possible worlds in which synthetic a priori propositions such as “7+5=12” are thinkably deniable—since synthetic a priori judgments are either true or truth-valueless in every logically possible world, it also follows that they are never false in any logically possible world and thus satisfy Kant’s general definition of a necessary truth, i.e., that a proposition is necessary if and only if it is strictly universally true, in that it is true in every member of a complete class of possible worlds and has no possible counterexamples or falsity-makers (Hanna 2001, ch. 5). Less abstractly and gallumphingly put, a synthetic a priori judgment is a necessary truth with a human face.

In the discussion so far, judgments are essentially identified with their propositional contents. But according to Kant it is also possible for a rational cognizer to use the very same propositional content in different ways. The fundamental difference in uses of judgments is between (a) theoretical judgments and (b) non-theoretical judgments. But there are also some crucial differences between theoretical uses of judgments. For a discussion of these kinds of use, see the following supplementary document:”

Supplement to Kant’s Theory of Judgment Kinds of Use

“In the Prolegomena, Kant offers this further definition of analogy: This type of cognition is cognition according to analogy, which surely does not signify, as the word is usually taken, an imperfect similarity between two things, but rather a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things.”

What Are Kant's Analogies about?

“Hume's fork, in epistemology, is a tenet elaborating upon British empiricist philosopher David Hume's emphatic, 1730s division between "relations of ideas" versus "matters of fact." (Alternatively, Hume's fork may refer to what is otherwise termed Hume's law, a tenet of ethics.)”

“Modal Rationalism and Modal Monism

Modal rationalism includes the thesis that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary possibility. Modal monism is the thesis that the space of logically possible worlds is coextensive with the space of metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper I explore the relation between the two theses. My aim is to show that the former thesis implies the latter thesis, and that problems with the latter make the former implausible as a complete picture of the epistemology of modality. My argument explores the relation between logical modality and metaphysical modality.”

Varieties of Modality

Spinoza’s Modal Metaphysics

Doubting Philosophical Distinctions

The Critique of Pure Reason - Immanuel Kant - Project and Context

The Critique of Pure Reason - Immanuel Kant - The Critical Problem and Synthetic a priori Judgments

Synchronicity, Inspiration and the Soul with Rico Sneller

The Critique of Pure Reason - Immanuel Kant - The Transcendental Aesthetic

The Critique of Pure Reason - Immanuel Kant - Transcendental Idealism and the Refutation of Idealism

The Critique of Pure Reason - Immanuel Kant - Judgments, Categories and Imagination

The "Critical Turn": Kant and Herz from 1770 to 1772

The Key to All Metaphysics: Kant's Letter to Herz, 1772

Possible Experience: Understanding Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

“The propositions within our pure reason handled in the logical consistency are those of mathematics and natural science corresponding to the synthetic a priori judgment. For example, in the mathematical proposition 3+2=5, the concept of 5 is not in 3+2 itself. The 5 is derived from the calculation of 3+2. This proposition gives us information. The scientific proposition that “every occurrence has its own cause” is also a synthetic a priori judgment. The concept of cause is not in every occurrence itself. In the mathematical and scientific propositions, the subject and the object are not tautology but two a priori concepts different from each other. Since the concept of subject differs from that of object, the propositions give us information. Also, in giving information, the mathematical and scientific propositions are synthetic. At the same time, these propositions are necessary and universal because they are fixed regardless of our experience. That is to say, Kant seeks necessity and universality through mathematical and scientific propositions, which are limited to pure reason based on space, time, and categories. … The noumenon logically keeps the Aristotelian law in that the thing-in-itself has no self- contradiction beyond the subjective limit. On the other hand, the a-priori category of the subject according to pure reason can construct propositions in logical consistency within the boundary of space and time.

Kant, of course, attempts to connect the phenomenon with the noumenon through practical reason. Because we have a limitation of pure theoretical reason, the concept of God or eternity cannot be regarded as the extension of theoretical knowledge. Eternity and God are based on a practical idea. The concept of God and immortality should be connected with our action. Even though we cannot reach the noumenon with our pure understanding, we should necessarily research the principle of the noumenal world as if there is ultimate truth in the world and should behave as if our spirit is immortal and as if there is a God. This obligation is not a logical object of our knowledge, but rather is regulative--a practical principle. Accordingly, Kant presents the practical part of human reason. Practical reason is the spontaneous action of the human spirit and the free and autonomous will.

The postulate of practical reason is a theoretical assumption for understanding ethical necessity. This postulate transcends the phenomenological world, where we cannot see its object. Therefore, practical reason is the issue of faith rather than of epistemology.”

The Pauli-Jung Conjecture and Its Impact Today

Synchronicity Nature and Psyche in an Interconnected Universe

Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle (Jung)

Archetypal Metaphysics and the Psyworld Embodiment Attractor States and Boundaries of Explanation On Ground and Universal Essence Preliminary Considerations toward an Archetypal Metaphysics On Holism Psyworld Esse in Anima Coda

“Foundationalists maintain that some beliefs are properly basic and that the rest of one’s beliefs inherit their epistemic status (knowledge or justification) in virtue of receiving proper support from the basic beliefs. Foundationalists have two main projects: a theory of proper basicality (that is, a theory of noninferential justification) and a theory of appropriate support (that is, a theory of inferential justification).”

“While there are some overlapping epistemological assumptions inherent in Kantian and neo-Kantian (e.g., Schopenhauer) formulations of subjectivity (both grounded in foundationalist ideology), this essay highlights some of the irreconcilable conceptual distinctions between the Kantian and Schopenhauerian edifice that Jung exploited. Jung frequently and explicitly referenced Kant, but his references lacked sufficient conceptual fidelity to Kant’s intent, often resulting in misleading or fallacious arguments. His actual theoretical kinship was more closely aligned to and influenced by other threads of thinking derived from Kant’s transcendentalism, generally associated with the philosophical movement known as German Idealism. The central tenets of that perspective included the idea that distinct and oppositional concepts could be mediated and unified into a universalizing totality, that the inaccessible (noumenon, ‘thing in itself’, Unheimlich, unconscious) was indeed a priori, yet apprehendable to human beings through intellectual intuition, and as a consequence, that foundational reality was organically unified and teleologically conceived (Schna ̈delbach 1984; Askay & Farquhar 2006; Bishop 2000). Whereas Kant located the noumenal realm ‘out there’ as the inaccessible and unknowable ‘thing-in-itself’, German Idealists relocated the gap between the absolute (noumenal realm) and relative (phenomenal realm) within the absolute itself (Gabriel & Zˇ izˇek 2009). In other words, the absolute became accessible via the texture of everyday, phenomenal reality. It was to neo-Kantian thought (and particularly to Schopenhauer) that Jung turned to clarify his own position that also located the gap between the phenomenal and noumenal realms within the psyche via esse in anima and the ‘psychoid’ archetype (1921/1971a, 1947/1954).

In the same decade (1920s) that Jung was aligning his psychological justification for the concept of esse in anima with Kant’s logical arguments for the idea of God, a different corpus of philosophical thought was being developed in Heidegger’s work beginning with Being and Time (1962/1927). That philosophy represented a radical departure from Cartesian presuppositions, including those dualisms tacitly adopted in Jung’s foundationalist epistemology (mind/matter, noumena/phenomena, conscious/unconscious, subject/object, instinct/psychoid, etc.). Heidegger did not disclaim the existence of such dualities, but contended they reflected abstract theoretical biases that were remote from concrete lived existence. Because of that bias, he intended to set aside a merely theoretical view of reality and instead focus on how things showed up in the everyday stream of life. For Heidegger, we already existed in a world in a pre-cognitive way, or put another way, ontology (being-ness) preceded epistemology (knowing-ness). There was no viable distinction between the existence of conceptual reality (noumenal realm) and how we live our lives in the everyday world (phenomenal realm). Heidegger’s fundamental ontology can be summarized in the phrase ‘phenomenological/hermeneutic ontology’ because his revisioning of phenomenology included recounting how being revealed itself in the phenomena of everyday social contexts and understanding such experience hermeneutically (via description) as ‘text to be interpreted’ (Askay & Farquhar 2006, fn. 18, p. 414).”